In this stimulating essay, Italian theologian Paolo Gamberini examines a decisive tension in contemporary Catholic thought: the relationship between doctrinal structures of “subsistence” and the lived participation of ecclesial communities. Moving from current debates on lay preaching, pastoral blessings, Christology, and ecclesiology, he shows how Catholic theology often distinguishes between a unique fullness and forms of partial, derivative participation. Gamberini’s central question, however, is whether this ontological logic can remain faithful to the Incarnation unless it allows itself to be challenged by the concrete life of the Church. Drawing on Pope Francis’s principle that “reality is greater than ideas,” the essay proposes an ecclesiology in which doctrine does not stand above experience, but listens attentively to the ways Christ continues to become present in the history, prayer, and discernment of the People of God
Courtesy of the author
Paolo Gamberini
24/6/2026
https://paologamberinisj.home.blog
Introduction
In the most recent debates within Catholic theology—from the question of lay preaching to the declaration Fiducia supplicans, from comparative Christology to ecumenical ecclesiology—a common logical structure increasingly emerges, one that runs across different doctrinal fields and illuminates them from a single perspective. This structure may be summarized in the formula: subsistence and participation. On the one hand, there is always a reality that possesses, in a full, original, and irreplaceable manner, that which grants it ontological identity; on the other hand, there are realities that genuinely participate in that fullness, but in a derived, partial, and asymmetrical way.
This essay seeks to highlight this logic through three distinct yet progressive stages of reflection. The first, liturgical and ecclesiological in character, begins with the concrete question of the role of the laity in the Liturgy of the Word and the analogy that this reveals with the pastoral blessings authorized by Fiducia supplicans. Here the tension between pastoral function and sacramental ontology manifests itself in all its sharpness, producing hybrid categories that risk becoming more nominal than real. The second stage, systematic in character, shows how the same conceptual architecture—the relationship between unique subsistence and derived participation—governs Christology, ecclesiology, the theology of priesthood, and the theology of blessings. The third stage, drawing upon Pope Francis’s Evangelii gaudium, introduces a decisive hermeneutical reversal: whereas the first two approaches move from ontology toward ecclesial reality, the third proposes that the lived reality of the Church itself should become the starting point of doctrinal reflection.
These three moments are not merely parallel. The first raises a question; the second offers a systematic category through which to articulate it; the third challenges that category from within, asking whether a doctrinal logic constructed from above—from ontology toward phenomenology—is truly faithful to the event of the Incarnation, or whether it risks obscuring the ecclesial reality it seeks to illuminate. The tension among these three moments is not resolved but deepened; it is the very tension of authentic theological thinking.
First Moment: Between Pastoral Function and Liturgical Ontology
The question of the role of the laity in the Liturgy of the Word is increasingly revealing the internal contradictions of contemporary liturgical theology. On the one hand, the celebration of a Liturgy of the Word “without priest or deacon” expresses the pastoral need to ensure the continuity of communal life even in the absence of ordained ministers. On the other hand, there remains the reaffirmation of the sacramental ontology of ordained ministry as a constitutive condition for the acts proper to the Liturgy of the Word, as clearly expressed in the response of the Dicastery for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments to the question posed by the German bishops, which prohibited qualified laypersons from delivering the homily (17 June 2026). The letter states that the proclamation of the Word within the liturgical celebration is inseparable from the mission sacramentally received.
This tension is not an isolated phenomenon. It finds a significant parallel in the distinction introduced by Fiducia supplicans between “liturgical” (official) blessings and “pastoral” (non-official) blessings addressed to irregular couples or same-sex couples. In both cases, the Church appears to oscillate between two ecclesiological models: a functional-pastoral model and a sacramental-ontological model. This oscillation generates ambiguities, and at times contradictions, which deserve careful analysis.
1. The Logic of Substitution and Pastoral Flexibility
In celebrations of the Liturgy of the Word without an ordained minister, a layperson assumes responsibility for leading the service. The perspective is clearly pastoral. Leadership of the celebration may be entrusted to a layperson; the proclamation of the readings is permitted; and a “reflection” or “exhortation” may be offered, provided that it is not called a “homily.”
The distinction between homily and reflection appears here to be a distinction of label rather than of nature. The act of commenting on Scripture is permitted, provided that it is not formally identified as a homily. The governing logic is one of functionality: what matters is that the community be gathered and nourished by the Word, even in the absence of an ordained minister.
By contrast, the response of the Dicastery for Divine Worship (17 June 2026) strongly affirms that the homily is not merely a disciplinary norm but an act arising from the very nature of the liturgy itself. It is inseparable from the proclamation of the Gospel and constitutes an exercise of the munus docendi sacramentally conferred through ordination.
Here the distinction is no longer functional but ontological. The homily is not a “qualified commentary” but a liturgical act belonging to the sacramental structure of the Church. It cannot be delegated, even in exceptional circumstances, and not even by means of an indult.
2. Two Incompatible Ecclesiological Models
A contradiction emerges precisely in the understanding of the Liturgy of the Word itself. In the first case, the Liturgy of the Word is treated as a flexible structure in which certain functions may be supplied by a layperson. The distinction between homily and reflection is presented as a distinction of degree.
In the second case, however, the Liturgy of the Word is understood as a unified sacramental act in which the proclamation of the Gospel and the homily constitute a single action inseparable from the ordained minister. The distinction between homily and reflection is therefore one of nature rather than degree.
If the homily is a constitutive part of the Liturgy of the Word, then a Liturgy of the Word led by a layperson cannot be considered a Liturgy of the Word in the full sense, but only a celebration of the Word in a derived form. In the first case one presupposes an ecclesiology of substitution; in the second, an ecclesiology of sacramentality.
3. The Analogy with Fiducia supplicans: Official and Non-Official Blessings
The same ambiguity appears in the distinction introduced by the Declaration of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, approved by Pope Francis in December 2023, which authorizes blessings for “irregular” couples, including same-sex couples.
Liturgical (official) blessings are those incorporated into the liturgical books and reserved to situations conforming to Catholic sacramental doctrine, namely marriage. Pastoral (non-official) blessings, by contrast, may be imparted to irregular or same-sex couples, provided that they do not take on a ritual form nor imitate a sacrament.
The logic is strikingly parallel to that governing celebrations of the Liturgy of the Word. The “official” act is reserved to the ordained minister and possesses a sacramental or sacramental-like character; the “non-official” act is permitted for pastoral reasons, if it does not assume ritual form or become confused with the official act.
As in the case of the homily, the distinction risks becoming merely formal. A “non-official” blessing remains a blessing; a “non-homiletic” reflection remains a commentary on Scripture. The difference is defined not by content but by ritual context and ecclesial intention. Inevitably, this generates pastoral and interpretative ambiguities.
4. A Common Root: The Tension between Pastoral Practice and Ontology
The contradiction surrounding celebrations of the Liturgy of the Word and the ambiguity of Fiducia supplicans reveal a deeper tension within the contemporary Church. On the one hand stands the pastoral imperative to welcome, accompany, provide for, and include everyone (todos, todos, todos); on the other hand stands the need to preserve the sacramental nature of ministry and liturgical acts.
This tension produces hybrid categories: a reflection that is not a homily yet resembles one; a pastoral blessing that is not liturgical yet remains a blessing. The Church thus appears to oscillate between two poles without fully integrating them.
The question that consequently arises is this: Is there a systematic principle capable of articulating—without dissolving—this tension between ontological fullness and pastoral participation?
Second Moment: The Catholic Logic of Subsistence and Participation
Across the various domains of Catholic doctrine, one encounters a common logical structure that may be described as the logic of unique subsistence and derived participation. This logic consists in affirming that a particular reality possesses, in a full, original, and irreplaceable way, that which other realities possess only in a participated, fragmentary, or incomplete manner. The difference does not concern merely the quantity of elements present, but the very principle that confers unity, identity, and consistency upon them.
In Christology, this logic appears in the doctrine of the hypostatic union. The human nature of Jesus possesses all the characteristics proper to humanity, yet its subsistence is not that of a distinct human person; rather, it subsists in the divine Person of the Logos. Other religious founders may share many of the traits that Christianity recognizes in Jesus of Nazareth—wisdom, experience of God, moral teaching, spiritual witness, and the capacity to gather communities of disciples. Nevertheless, according to classical doctrine, they do not possess that which makes Christ unique: the subsistence of human nature in the eternal Person of the Word. The decisive difference therefore lies not in the presence or absence of particular empirical features, but in the ontological principle that sustains them.
The same structure reappears in ecclesiology. By affirming that the Church of Christ “subsists” in the Catholic Church, the Second Vatican Council acknowledged that authentic ecclesial elements are present in other Christian communities: the Word of God, Baptism, faith in Christ, sanctification, and evangelical witness. Yet these elements, while real and effective, do not possess that fullness of subsistence which Catholic doctrine locates uniquely within the Catholic Church. Once again, the presence of common elements is not denied; rather, an asymmetry is affirmed between fullness of subsistence and partial participation.
An analogous logic governs the distinction between the common priesthood of all the faithful and the ministerial priesthood. Both participate in the one priesthood of Christ; both are ordered toward the building up of the People of God; both exercise functions that, in certain respects, may appear similar. Nevertheless, Catholic theology maintains that the ministerial priesthood differs from the baptismal priesthood not merely in function but in degree and mode of participation. Consequently, certain ecclesial actions—such as presiding at the Eucharist or delivering the homily during a liturgical celebration—do not depend simply upon the possession of particular abilities or competencies, but upon the subsistence of a unique sacramental relationship to Christ the Head, conferred through ordination. Once more, the decisive distinction is ontological rather than empirical.
The same framework is evident today in the distinction between liturgical-sacramental blessings and pastoral blessings. The former are organically integrated into the sacramental life of the Church and receive their normative form from the official liturgical books. The latter, by contrast, possess a pastoral character and do not intend to express the same sacramental configuration. For this reason, they may also be imparted to persons whose objective situation does not fully correspond to ecclesial teaching. The difference does not consist merely in the content of the prayer but in the different level of participation in the sacramental reality of the Church. A pastoral blessing contains elements of ecclesial blessing, yet it does not subsist in the same sacramental form that characterizes a liturgical blessing.
In all these cases, one finds the same conceptual architecture. On the one hand stands a reality regarded as unique, full, and normative: Christ in relation to other religious mediators; the Catholic Church in relation to other ecclesial communities; ordained ministry in relation to the common priesthood; sacramental blessing in relation to pastoral forms of blessing. On the other hand realities that genuinely participate in certain elements of the first without possessing the same mode of subsistence.
The relationship is therefore not one of absolute opposition, since there is genuine continuity between the two poles. Yet neither is it a relationship of simple equivalence, because a fundamental asymmetry remains. This logic may be described as a tension between fullness and participation, uniqueness and fragmentation, original subsistence and derived presence. It allows one to recognize the reality and value of elements present outside the form considered complete, while at the same time preserving the affirmation of a unique normative center.
For precisely this reason, it represents one of the foundational structures of contemporary Catholic doctrinal thought.
Yet—and here the way opens for a third stage of reflection—this logic, however coherent and sophisticated, risks operating entirely within the realm of idea, concept, and classification. It describes with precision how ecclesial realities relate to one another within an ontological hierarchy, but the description proceeds from above to below, from category to life, from subsistence to the community that prays, celebrates, and lives. Pope Francis, in Evangelii gaudium, raises a question that this framework cannot avoid: What if reality itself must interrogate the idea, rather than the idea simply classifying reality?
Third Moment: Ecclesial Phenomenology as the Point of Departure
In Evangelii gaudium (nn. 231–233), Pope Francis articulates one of the fundamental hermeneutical principles of his pontificate: reality is greater than ideas. This principle is neither relativistic nor anti-intellectual. On the contrary, it is rooted in the very logic of the Incarnation itself:
“By this you know the Spirit of God: every spirit that confesses Jesus Christ come in the flesh is from God” (1 Jn 4:2).
The Word became flesh, not concept. Christian truth is not an ideal structure to be imposed upon history, but an event that became incarnate within history and continues to become incarnate.
This principle introduces a methodological priority of extraordinary significance for theology and ecclesiology: it is not the idea that validates reality; rather, reality interrogates the idea and tests its fidelity. Ideas—conceptual elaborations, doctrinal categories, systematic constructions—are legitimate and necessary, but they exist for the sake of grasping, understanding, and guiding reality.
When ideas become detached from reality, what emerges is no longer theology but ideology: a system that may classify or define, yet fails to touch life, generate conversion, or bear fruit.
1. Nominalism as the Risk of Ontological Logic
When the previous reflections are reread in light of this principle, a question emerges that cannot be ignored.
The logic of subsistence and participation—however rigorously articulated—operates primarily within the sphere of formal ontology. It determines who possesses something fully, who participates in it derivatively, and where the normative center resides. Yet this classificatory operation, carried out with all the conceptual precision characteristic of theology, risks remaining, in Francis’s words, within “the realm of mere words, images, and sophistry.”
The danger is not theoretical but pastoral.
When one states that a layperson’s reflection is not a homily because it does not subsist in the same sacramental relation to Christ the Head, one is making an ontologically precise statement. Yet one is also making a statement that the concrete Christian community—one that for years may have listened to that reflection, been nourished by it, and recognized in it the action of the Spirit—may not recognize within its own lived experience. Ontology and phenomenology diverge. The question posed by Pope Francis is therefore unavoidable: Which of the two is called to interrogate the other?
The Apostolic Exhortation lists among the forms of concealing reality “angelic purisms,” “declarationist nominalisms,” “projects more formal than real,” “ahistorical fundamentalisms,” and “intellectualisms without wisdom.” This catalogue sounds remarkably familiar to anyone who has participated in liturgical and doctrinal debates over the past decades.
“Declarationist nominalism” is precisely that form of thought which attempts to solve a real problem through a terminological distinction: the reflection is not a homily; the pastoral blessing is not liturgical; the communion of divorced and remarried persons is not “public” access to the sacraments.
The distinction may indeed be theologically justified. Yet if it is not accompanied by an understanding of the reality it seeks to name, it remains an exercise in cosmetics rather than genuine theological discernment.
2. Ecclesial Phenomenology as a Locus Theologicus
The principle that “reality is greater than ideas” has precise implications for ecclesiological method. It suggests that the lived reality of the ecclesial community—its experience of prayer, celebration, mutual edification, and discernment of the Spirit—is not merely the raw material that doctrine subsequently classifies and orders. Rather, it is itself a locus theologicus: a place in which truth manifests itself and from which theological reflection must begin, rather than a reality to which pre-established categories are simply applied.
This does not mean that ecclesial experience becomes the ultimate criterion of theological truth, nor that doctrine should merely ratify whatever practices emerge within the community. It means something more subtle and more demanding: theology must be capable of listening to ecclesial reality before judging it; it must allow itself to be questioned by what the Spirit appears to be accomplishing in the life of the People of God before determining whether that life conforms to established ontological categories.
Pope Francis explicitly recalls the need to “value the history of the Church as a history of salvation” and to remember “our saints who have inculturated the Gospel in the life of our peoples.” History is not an accidental backdrop to doctrine. It is the place where the incarnate Word continues to become incarnate.
The principle that “reality is greater than ideas” therefore affects not only the configuration of ecclesiology but also Christology itself, particularly when viewed through attentive listening to the spiritual phenomena present within other religious traditions.
Applied to the liturgical question discussed in the first stage of reflection, this perspective produces a significant shift. The question is no longer simply: “Can a layperson preach the homily according to the sacramental structure of ordained ministry?” To this question, ontological logic responds coherently in the negative. The question becomes instead: “What has actually occurred in those communities where, for years or even decades, a layperson has led the Liturgy of the Word, offered reflections on Scripture, and nourished the faith of those present? What ecclesial reality has come into being? How has the Spirit acted within it? And is doctrine capable of recognizing this reality, naming it faithfully, and integrating it into the Church’s self-understanding?” These questions do not abolish ontology. Rather, they ask ontology to confront the reality from which it claims to speak.
3. The Risk of Ahistorical Fundamentalism and Ontological Angelism
Pope Francis identifies “ahistorical fundamentalisms” as one of the ways in which reality may be concealed by ideas. Such fundamentalism is not necessarily associated with a particular ideological position within the Church. It is the tendency to assume that a specific historical form of doctrine or practice is itself the original and immutable structure of truth, thereby exempting it from historical interpretation and pastoral discernment.
The logic of subsistence and participation, insofar as it is constructed entirely from abstract ontological categories—person, nature, subsistence, participation—and does not permit the history of ecclesial life to question those categories from within, risks becoming precisely such an ahistorical fundamentalism, albeit in a sophisticated form.
It accurately describes the formal structure of relationships among ecclesial realities. Yet it often fails to ask how that structure itself emerged historically, which cultural and conceptual mediations shaped its categories, and which ecclesial realities were effectively included or excluded through its concrete application.
The “angelic purisms” mentioned by Francis designate the tendency to treat spiritual and sacramental realities as though they were pure entities detached from history, culture, embodiment, and concrete community life.
A purely ontological ecclesiology—one that determines who possesses fullness and who participates derivatively without asking how such fullness is historically manifested and how such participation is concretely lived—is a form of ecclesial angelism. It describes the ideal structure of the Church rather than the Church that actually journeys through history.
4. Phenomenology Underlying Ontology: A Methodological Reversal
The title of this reflection asserts that phenomenology underlies ontology, not that it replaces it. This is a methodological reversal rather than a rejection of ontology.
Ontology remains indispensable. Without it, theology cannot distinguish, evaluate, or discern. Yet ontology, if it is to remain truthful rather than ideological, must recognize its own phenomenological foundation. It must begin from lived reality, allow itself to be questioned by that reality, and remain capable of revising its categories whenever reality exceeds or surprises them.
This is what Pope Francis calls “harmonious objectivity,” in contrast to “formal nominalism.” It is not the abandonment of truth but the pursuit of a truth illuminated by reason while remaining capable of engaging life because it begins from reality and returns to it.
The transition from formal nominalism to harmonious objectivity is not a lowering of theology’s intellectual ambitions. It is their deepening.
Applied to ecclesiology, this reversal means that the question of who possesses the priesthood fully and who participates in it derivatively cannot be resolved solely on the basis of the ontological structure of ordained ministry while disregarding the phenomenological reality of ecclesial life.
One must also ask:
- How does the common priesthood of the faithful manifest itself concretely?
- What ecclesial acts does it generate?
- How is it articulated in the life of communities alongside ordained ministry?
Answering such questions does not abolish ontological distinctions. Rather, it places them within their proper horizon: that of a Church journeying through history, discerning the Spirit in the signs of the times, and refusing to reduce the truth of the Incarnation to a system of formal categories.
5. Ecclesial Reality as the Starting Point of Doctrine
The most radical consequence of the principle that “reality is greater than ideas” for ecclesiology is this: Lived ecclesial reality must be the starting point, not the endpoint, of doctrinal reflection. This does not mean that everything that happens within the Church is automatically legitimate, nor that ecclesial practice simply takes precedence over doctrine in a chronological sense. It means that doctrine always arises from an ecclesial experience; it names that experience, illuminates it, and guides it. Doctrine does not precede reality as an external blueprint imposed upon it.
Ecclesial gnosticism is not only the privileging of esoteric knowledge over communal experience. It is also—and perhaps above all—the privileging of conceptual coherence over fidelity to incarnate reality. An ecclesiology capable of explaining with precision why a layperson’s reflection is not a homily, yet incapable of listening to what that reflection has generated within the life of communities, becomes a gnostic ecclesiology: rigorous and coherent perhaps, but ultimately sterile. The true starting point of doctrine must therefore be ecclesial reality in its concrete phenomenology:
- communities that pray;
- persons who are converted;
- the poor who are evangelized;
- laypeople who lead;
- women in charge of pastoral responsibilities;
- believers who discern.
From this reality doctrine must begin, naming it faithfully, distinguishing within it what is authentic from what is deficient, and orienting it toward the fullness to which it is called. Yet that fullness is not a pre-existing idea imposed upon reality. It is the living reality of the risen Christ, who continues to become incarnate within the history of his Church.
Conclusion: Toward an Ecclesiology of Incarnation
The path traced throughout this reflection may be summarized as a threefold movement. The first stage identified a genuine tension within contemporary ecclesial life: the difficulty of reconciling pastoral flexibility with the ontological structure of the sacraments, resulting in hybrid categories that risk becoming more nominal than real. The second stage proposed a systematic principle for articulating this tension: the logic of subsistence and participation, which describes relationships among ecclesial realities in terms of original fullness and derived presence. The third stage challenged this principle from within, asking—together with Pope Francis—whether a logic constructed from above, moving from ontology toward phenomenology, is truly faithful to the event of the Incarnation, or whether it risks becoming an ideal system that classifies reality without allowing itself to be questioned by it.
The outcome is not the dissolution of the logic of subsistence and participation, but its relocation within a broader and more faithful methodological horizon. Ontology remains necessary. Without it, theology cannot distinguish, evaluate, or discern. Yet ontology must be grounded in phenomenology. It must begin from the lived reality of the ecclesial community—what today is often described in terms of synodality—allow itself to be questioned by that reality, and remain capable of revising its categories whenever reality exceeds them. As Peter declared in the house of Cornelius: “I truly understand that God shows no partiality” (Acts 10:34). This means, concretely, that the proper theological question is not only: Who possesses the gift of God in its fullness and who participates in it partially? It is also: What is actually happening in the life of communities? Where do the fruits of the Spirit become manifest? How is the Word becoming incarnate within this concrete history?
The answers to such questions do not abolish ontological distinctions. Rather, they compel those distinctions to measure themselves against reality—and that very process of measurement constitutes the heart of authentic theological method. An ecclesiology of incarnation—the horizon toward which the three stages of this reflection converge—is one that knows how to hold together, without confusing them and without separating them, the principle of subsistence and the experience of participation, the ontological structure of ministry and the phenomenology of communal life, doctrinal normativity and the history of salvation unfolding within the People of God.
Such an ecclesiology neither reduces truth to experience nor reduces experience to formal truth. Rather, it recognizes that Christian truth is always, by its very nature, incarnational. Consequently, it can only be preserved through the continual dialogue between idea and reality, ontology and phenomenology, normative center and concrete ecclesial life. “Reality is greater than ideas” is therefore not a concession to relativism. It is perhaps one of the most radical affirmations of Christian faith itself. The God who “so loved the world” (Jn 3:16) did not send a system of concepts but his Son in flesh and blood. And that flesh continues to be the privileged theological locus—not despite history, but through it.
An ecclesiology of incarnation thus invites theology to move beyond the opposition between doctrinal normativity and historical experience. The task is not to abandon ontology in favor of phenomenology, nor to dissolve doctrine into practice, but to recognize that the truth of the Gospel is always encountered in lived reality before it is articulated conceptually. Theological reflection remains indispensable, yet its vocation is to serve the mystery that precedes it: the living presence of Christ in the history of humanity and in the life of the Church.
The final challenge, therefore, is not to choose between ontology and phenomenology, but to allow ontology to be continually renewed by phenomenology, just as doctrine must be continually renewed by the living reality of the Gospel. In this sense, the Church does not move from doctrine to reality; rather, it moves from reality toward a deeper understanding of doctrine, because the reality from which it begins is none other than the continuing presence of the incarnate and risen Christ in the history of his people.
